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In the immediate aftermath of September 11,President Bush stated that the perpetrators of the
deed would be brought to justice. Soon afterwards, the
President announced that the United States would
engage in a war on terrorism. The first of these state-
ments adopts the familiar language of criminal law
and criminal justice. It treats the September 11 attacks
as horrific crimes—mass murders—and the govern-
ment’s mission as apprehending and punishing the
surviving planners and conspirators for their roles in
the crimes. The War on Terrorism is a different propo-
sition, however, and a different model of governmental
action—not law but war. Most obviously, it dramati-
cally broadens the scope of action, because now terror-
ists who knew nothing about September 11 have been
earmarked as enemies. But that is only the beginning.
The Hybrid War-Law Approach
The model of war offers much freer rein than that of
law, and therein lies its appeal in the wake of 9/11.
First, in war but not in law it is permissible to use
lethal force on enemy troops regardless of their degree
of personal involvement with the adversary. The con-
scripted cook is as legitimate a target as the enemy
general. Second, in war but not in law “collateral dam-
age,” that is, foreseen but unintended killing of non-
combatants, is permissible. (Police cannot blow up an
apartment building full of people because a murderer
is inside, but an air force can bomb the building if it
contains a military target.) Third, the requirements of
evidence and proof are drastically weaker in war than
in criminal justice. Soldiers do not need proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, or even proof by a preponderance of
evidence, that someone is an enemy soldier before fir-
ing on him or capturing and imprisoning him. They
don’t need proof at all, merely plausible intelligence.
Thus, the U.S. military remains regretful but unapolo-
getic about its January 2002 attack on the Afghani
town of Uruzgan, in which 21 innocent civilians were
killed, based on faulty intelligence that they were al
Qaeda fighters. Fourth, in war one can attack an
enemy without concern over whether he has done
anything. Legitimate targets are those who in the
course of combat might harm us, not those who have
harmed us. No doubt there are other significant differ-
ences as well. But the basic point should be clear: given
Washington’s mandate to eliminate the danger of
future 9/11s, so far as humanly possible, the model of
war offers important advantages over the model of
law.
There are disadvantages as well. Most obviously, in
war but not in law, fighting back is a legitimate
response of the enemy. Second, when nations fight a
war, other nations may opt for neutrality. Third,
because fighting back is legitimate, in war the enemy
soldier deserves special regard once he is rendered
harmless through injury or surrender. It is impermissi-
ble to punish him for his role in fighting the war. Nor
can he be harshly interrogated after he is captured. The
Third Geneva Convention provides: “Prisoners of war
who refuse to answer [questions] may not be threat-
ened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvan-
tageous treatment of any kind.” And, when the war
concludes, the enemy soldier must be repatriated. 
Here, however, Washington has different ideas,
designed to eliminate these tactical disadvantages in
the traditional war model. Washington regards inter-
national terrorism not only as a military adversary, but
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also as a criminal activity and criminal conspiracy. In
the law model, criminals don’t get to shoot back, and
their acts of violence subject them to legitimate punish-
ment. That is what we see in Washington’s prosecution
of the War on Terrorism. Captured terrorists may be
tried before military or civilian tribunals, and shooting
back at Americans, including American troops, is a
federal crime (for a statute under which John Walker
Lindh was indicted criminalizes anyone regardless of
nationality, who “outside the United States attempts to
kill, or engages in a conspiracy to kill, a national of the
United States” or “engages in physical violence with
intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the
United States; or with the result that serious bodily
injury is caused to a national of the United States”).
Furthermore, the U.S. may rightly demand that other
countries not be neutral about murder and terrorism.
Unlike the war model, a nation may insist that those
who are not with us in fighting murder and terror are
against us, because by not joining our operations they
are providing a safe haven for terrorists or their bank
accounts. By selectively combining elements of the war
model and elements of the law model, Washington is
able to maximize its own ability to mobilize lethal
force against terrorists while eliminating most tradi-
tional rights of a military adversary, as well as the
rights of innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire.
A Limbo of Rightlessness
The legal status of al Qaeda suspects imprisoned at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba is emblem-
atic of this hybrid war-law approach to the threat of
terrorism. In line with the war model, they lack the
usual rights of criminal suspects—the presumption of
innocence, the right to a hearing to determine guilt, the
opportunity to prove that the authorities have grabbed
the wrong man. But, in line with the law model, they
are considered unlawful combatants. Because they are
not uniformed forces, they lack the rights of prisoners
of war and are liable to criminal punishment. Initially,
the American government declared that the
Guantanamo Bay prisoners have no rights under the
Geneva Conventions. In the face of international
protests, Washington quickly backpedaled and
announced that the Guantanamo Bay prisoners would
indeed be treated as decently as POWs—but it also
made clear that the prisoners have no right to such
treatment. Neither criminal suspects nor POWs, nei-
ther fish nor fowl, they inhabit a limbo of rightlessness.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s assertion that the U.S.
may continue to detain them even if they are acquitted
by a military tribunal dramatizes the point.
To understand how extraordinary their status is,
consider an analogy. Suppose that Washington
declares a War on Organized Crime. Troops are dis-
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patched to Sicily, and a number of Mafiosi are seized,
brought to Guantanamo Bay, and imprisoned without
a hearing for the indefinite future, maybe the rest of
their lives. They are accused of no crimes, because
their capture is based not on what they have done but
on what they might do. After all, to become “made”
they took oaths of obedience to the bad guys. Seizing
them accords with the war model: they are enemy foot
soldiers. But they are foot soldiers out of uniform; they
lack a “fixed distinctive emblem,” in the words of The
Hague Convention. That makes them unlawful com-
batants, so they lack the rights of POWs. They may
object that it is only a unilateral declaration by the
American President that has turned them into combat-
ants in the first place—he called it a war, they didn’t—
and that, since they do not regard themselves as literal
foot soldiers it never occurred to them to wear a fixed
distinctive emblem. They have a point. It seems too
easy for the President to divest anyone in the world of
rights and liberty simply by announcing that the U.S.
is at war with them and then declaring them unlawful
combatants if they resist. But, in the hybrid war-law
model, they protest in vain.
Consider another example. In January 2002, U.S.
forces in Bosnia seized five Algerians and a Yemeni
suspected of al Qaeda connections and took them to
Guantanamo Bay. The six had been jailed in Bosnia,
but a Bosnian court released them for lack of evidence,
and the Bosnian Human Rights Chamber issued an
injunction that four of them be allowed to remain in
the country pending further legal proceedings. The
Human Rights Chamber, ironically, was created under
U.S. auspices in the Dayton peace accords, and it was
designed specifically to protect against treatment like
this. Ruth Wedgwood, a well-known international law
scholar at Yale and a member of the Council on
Foreign Relations, defended the Bosnian seizure in
war-model terms. “I think we would simply argue this
was a matter of self-defense. One of the fundamental
rules of military law is that you have a right ultimately
to act in self-defense. And if these folks were actively
plotting to blow up the U.S. embassy, they should be
considered combatants and captured as combatants in
a war.” Notice that Professor Wedgwood argues in
terms of what the men seized in Bosnia were planning
to do, not what they did; notice as well that the decision
of the Bosnian court that there was insufficient evi-
dence does not matter. These are characteristics of the
war model.
More recently, two American citizens alleged to be al
Qaeda operatives (Jose Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah al
Muhajir, and Yasser Esam Hamdi) have been held in
American military prisons, with no crimes charged, no
opportunity to consult counsel, and no hearing. The
President described Padilla as “a bad man” who aimed
to build a nuclear “dirty” bomb and use it against
America; and the Justice Department has classified
both men as “enemy combatants” who may be held
indefinitely. Yet, as military law expert Gary Solis
points out, “Until now, as used by the attorney general,
the term ‘enemy combatant’ appeared nowhere in U.S.
criminal law, international law or in the law of war.”
The phrase comes from the 1942 Supreme Court case
Ex parte Quirin, but all the Court says there is that “an
enemy combatant who without uniform comes
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging
war by destruction of life or property” would “not . . .
be entitled to the status of prisoner of war, but . . . [they
would] be offenders against the law of war subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals.” For the
Court, in other words, the status of a person as a non-
uniformed enemy combatant makes him a criminal
rather than a warrior, and determines where he is tried
(in a military, rather than a civilian, tribunal) but not
whether he is tried. Far from authorizing open-ended
confinement, Ex parte Quirin presupposes that crimi-
nals are entitled to hearings: without a hearing how
can suspects prove that the government made a mis-
take? Quirin embeds the concept of “enemy combat-
ant” firmly in the law model. In the war model, by
contrast, POWs may be detained without a hearing
until hostilities are over. But POWs were captured in
uniform, and only their undoubted identity as enemy
soldiers justifies such open-ended custody. Apparently,
Hamdi and Padilla will get the worst of both models—
open-ended custody with no trial, like POWs, but no
certainty beyond the U.S. government’s say-so that
they really are “bad men.” This is the hybrid war-law
model. It combines the Quirin category of “enemy
combatant without uniform,” used in the law model to
justify a military trial, with the war model’s practice of
indefinite confinement with no trial at all.
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The Case for the Hybrid Approach
Is there any justification for the hybrid war-law
model, which so drastically diminishes the rights of
the enemy? An argument can be offered along the fol-
lowing lines. In ordinary cases of war among states,
enemy soldiers may well be morally and politically
innocent. Many of them are conscripts, and those who
aren’t do not necessarily endorse the state policies they
are fighting to defend. But enemy soldiers in the War
on Terrorism are, by definition, those who have
embarked on a path of terrorism. They are neither
morally nor politically innocent. Their sworn aim—
“Death to America!”—is to create more 9/11s. In this
respect, they are much more akin to criminal conspira-
tors than to conscript soldiers. Terrorists will fight as
soldiers when they must, and metamorphose into
mass murderers when they can.
Furthermore, suicide terrorists pose a special, unique
danger. Ordinary criminals do not target innocent
bystanders. They may be willing to kill them if neces-
sary, but bystanders enjoy at least some measure of
security because they are not primary targets. Not so
with terrorists, who aim to kill as many innocent peo-
ple as possible. Likewise, innocent bystanders are pro-
tected from ordinary criminals by whatever deterrent
force the threat of punishment and the risk of getting
killed in the act of committing a crime offer. For a sui-
cide bomber, neither of these threats is a deterrent at
all—after all, for the suicide bomber one of the hall-
marks of a successful operation is that he winds up
dead at day’s end. Given the unique and heightened
danger that suicide terrorists pose, a stronger response
that grants potential terrorists fewer rights may be jus-
tified. Add to this the danger that terrorists may come
to possess weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear devices in suitcases. Under circumstances of
such dire menace, it is appropriate to treat terrorists as
though they embody the most dangerous aspects of
both warriors and criminals. That is the basis of the
hybrid war-law model.
The Case against Expediency
The argument against the hybrid war-law model is
equally clear. The U.S. has simply chosen the bits of the
law model and the bits of the war model that are most
convenient for American interests, and ignored the
rest. The model abolishes the rights of potential ene-
mies (and their innocent shields) by fiat—not for rea-
sons of moral or legal principle, but solely because the
U.S. does not want them to have rights. The more
rights they have, the more risk they pose. But
Americans’ urgent desire to minimize our risks doesn’t
make other people’s rights disappear. Calling our pol-
icy a War on Terrorism obscures this point.
The theoretical basis of the objection is that the law
model and the war model each comes as a package,
with a kind of intellectual integrity. The law model
grows out of relationships within states, while the war
model arises from relationships between states. The
law model imputes a ground-level community of val-
ues to those subject to the law—paradigmatically, citi-
zens of a state, but also visitors and foreigners who
choose to engage in conduct that affects a state. Only
because law imputes shared basic values to the com-
munity can a state condemn the conduct of criminals
and inflict punishment on them. Criminals deserve
condemnation and punishment because their conduct
violates norms that we are entitled to count on their
sharing. But, for the same reason—the imputed com-
munity of values—those subject to the law ordinarily
enjoy a presumption of innocence and an expectation
of safety. The government cannot simply grab them
and confine them without making sure they have bro-
ken the law, nor can it condemn them without due
process for ensuring that it has the right person, nor
can it knowingly place bystanders in mortal peril in
the course of fighting crime. They are our fellows, and
the community should protect them just as it protects
us. The same imputed community of values that justi-
fies condemnation and punishment creates rights to
due care and due process.
War is different. War is the ultimate acknowledg-
ment that human beings do not live in a single com-
munity with shared norms. If their norms conflict
enough, communities pose a physical danger to each
other, and nothing can safeguard a community against
its enemies except force of arms. That makes enemy
soldiers legitimate targets; but it makes our soldiers
legitimate targets as well, and, once the enemy no
longer poses a danger, he should be immune from
punishment, because if he has fought cleanly he has
violated no norms that we are entitled to presume he
honors. Our norms are, after all, our norms, not his.
Because the law model and war model come as con-
ceptual packages, it is unprincipled to wrench them
apart and recombine them simply because it is in
America’s interest to do so. To declare that Americans
can fight enemies with the latitude of warriors, but if
the enemies fight back they are not warriors but crimi-
nals, amounts to a kind of heads-I-win-tails-you-lose
international morality in which whatever it takes to
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reduce American risk, no matter what the cost to oth-
ers, turns out to be justified. This, in brief, is the criti-
cism of the hybrid war-law model.
To be sure, the law model could be made to incorpo-
rate the war model merely by rewriting a handful of
statutes. Congress could enact laws permitting impris-
onment or execution of persons who pose a significant
threat of terrorism whether or not they have already
done anything wrong. The standard of evidence could
be set low and the requirement of a hearing elimi-
nated. Finally, Congress could authorize the use of
lethal force against terrorists regardless of the danger
to innocent bystanders, and it could immunize officials
from lawsuits or prosecution by victims of collateral
damage. Such statutes would violate the Constitution,
but the Constitution could be amended to incorporate
anti-terrorist exceptions to the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. In the end, we would have a system of
law that includes all the essential features of the war
model.
It would, however, be a system that imprisons peo-
ple for their intentions rather than their actions, and
that offers the innocent few protections against mis-
taken detention or inadvertent death through collateral
damage. Gone are the principles that people should
never be punished for their thoughts, only for their
deeds, and that innocent people must be protected
rather than injured by their own government. In that
sense, at any rate, repackaging war as law seems
merely cosmetic, because it replaces the ideal of law as
a protector of rights with the more problematic goal of
protecting some innocent people by sacrificing others.
The hypothetical legislation incorporates war into law
only by making law as partisan and ruthless as war. It
no longer resembles law as Americans generally
understand it.
The Threat to International Human Rights
In the War on Terrorism, what becomes of interna-
tional human rights? It seems beyond dispute that the
war model poses a threat to international human
rights, because honoring human rights is neither prac-
tically possible nor theoretically required during war.
Combatants are legitimate targets; non-combatants
maimed by accident or mistake are regarded as collat-
eral damage rather than victims of atrocities; cases of
mistaken identity get killed or confined without a
hearing because combat conditions preclude due
process. To be sure, the laws of war specify minimum
human rights, but these are far less robust than rights
in peacetime—and the hybrid war-law model reduces
this schedule of rights even further by classifying the
enemy as unlawful combatants.
One striking example of the erosion of human rights
is tolerance of torture. It should be recalled that a 1995
al Qaeda plot to bomb eleven U.S. airliners was
thwarted by information tortured out of a Pakistani
suspect by the Philippine police—an eerie real-life ver-
sion of the familiar philosophical thought-experiment.
The Washington Post reports that since September 11
the U.S. has engaged in the summary transfer of
dozens of terrorism suspects to countries where they
will be interrogated under torture. But it isn’t just the
United States that has proven willing to tolerate tor-
ture for security reasons. Last December, the Swedish
government snatched a suspected Islamic extremist to
whom it had previously granted political asylum, and
the same day had him transferred to Egypt, where
Amnesty International reports that he has been tor-
tured to the point where he walks only with difficulty.
Sweden is not, to say the least, a traditionally hard-line
nation on human rights issues. None of this interna-
tional transportation is lawful—indeed, it violates
international treaty obligations under the Convention
against Torture that in the U.S. have constitutional sta-
tus as “supreme Law of the Land”—but that may not
matter under the war model, in which even constitu-
tional rights may be abrogated.
It is natural to suggest that this suspension of human
rights is an exceptional emergency measure to deal
with an unprecedented threat. This raises the question
of how long human rights will remain suspended.
When will the war be over?
Here, the chief problem is that the War on Terrorism
is not like any other kind of war. The enemy, Terrorism,
is not a territorial state or nation or government. There
is no opposite number to negotiate with. There is no
one on the other side to call a truce or declare a cease-
fire, no one among the enemy authorized to surrender.
In traditional wars among states, the war aim is, as
Clausewitz argued, to impose one state’s political will
on another’s. The aim of the war is not to kill the
enemy—killing the enemy is the means used to achieve
the real end, which is to force capitulation. In the War
on Terrorism, no capitulation is possible. That means
that the real aim of the war is, quite simply, to kill or
capture all of the terrorists—to keep on killing and
killing, capturing and capturing, until they are all
gone.
Of course, no one expects that terrorism will ever
disappear completely. Everyone understands that new
anti-American extremists, new terrorists, will always
arise and always be available for recruitment and
deployment. Everyone understands that even if al
Qaeda is destroyed or decapitated, other groups, with
other leaders, will arise in its place. It follows, then,
that the War on Terrorism will be a war that can only
be abandoned, never concluded. The War has no nat-
ural resting point, no moment of victory or finality. It
requires a mission of killing and capturing, in territo-
ries all over the globe, that will go on in perpetuity. It
13
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follows as well that the suspension of human rights
implicit in the hybrid war-law model is not temporary
but permanent.
Perhaps with this fear in mind, Congressional autho-
rization of President Bush’s military campaign limits
its scope to those responsible for September 11 and
their sponsors. But the War on Terrorism has taken on a
life of its own that makes the Congressional authoriza-
tion little more than a technicality. Because of the threat
of nuclear terror, the American leadership actively
debates a war on Iraq regardless of whether Iraq was
implicated in September 11; and the President’s yoking
of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea into a single axis of evil
because they back terror suggests that the War on
Terrorism might eventually encompass all these
nations. If the U.S. ever unearths tangible evidence that
any of these countries is harboring or abetting terrorists
with weapons of mass destruction, there can be little
doubt that Congress will support military action. So
too, Russia invokes the American War on Terrorism to
justify its attacks on Chechen rebels, China uses it to
deflect criticisms of its campaign against Uighur sepa-
ratists, and Israeli Prime Minister Sharon explicitly
links military actions against Palestinian insurgents to
the American War on Terrorism. No doubt there is
political opportunism at work in some or all of these
efforts to piggy-back onto America’s campaign, but the
opportunity would not exist if “War on Terrorism”
were merely the code-name of a discrete, neatly-boxed
American operation. Instead, the War on Terrorism has
become a model of politics, a world-view with its own
distinctive premises and consequences. As I have
argued, it includes a new model of state action, the
hybrid war-law model, which depresses human rights
from their peace-time standard to the war-time stan-
dard, and indeed even further. So long as it continues,
the War on Terrorism means the end of human rights,
at least for those near enough to be touched by the fire
of battle.
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